“Marcus Thames did exactly what you should do as a pinch hitter: on the first good pitch you see, jump all over it.” — Rod Allen, FSN-Detroit color announcer, May 5, 2008

Cliché: “The best pinch-hitters are very aggressive fastball hitters.”
Verdict: False
Why: The idea that a pinch hitter should swing early stems from the false understanding of the pinch hitter as a man who comes up in a key situation with one job: to drive in a baserunner. This is a flawed conception because of the very status of the pinch hitter himself. If he is relegated to first-man-off-the-bench duties, he must necessarily be worse than any other options at his position. Furthermore, although we can safely assume he is situationally better than the batter he replaces (not a foregone conclusion, however), he is likely to be worse than the starting position player who is on deck. Therefore, why strive for an all-or-nothing plate approach when there is likely to be a better batter waiting in the wings in the event of a mere base on balls?

Jeff Pentland, hitting coach for the Seattle Mariners, expresses one flawed justification for this fallacy perfectly:

“When you come off the bench, the pitcher thinks you[’re] cold. That’s why they’ll see a lot of fastballs. Your best pinch-hitters are very aggressive fastball hitters. Generally speaking, the best pinch-hitters don’t let the first one go. They’re able to make good contact early. That’s a big key, so you don’t get into breaking ball counts.”

Locked up in this explanation are a few assumptions. First, the assumption that a pitcher is fresh and is throwing fastballs for strikes. Second, the assumption that batters who are “very aggressive fastball hitters” don’t get as cold or have as much trouble catching up to fastballs immediately off the bench. Third, the assumption is present that pitchers (and managers) don’t realize this, and therefore won’t adjust their strategies according to the approach of the hitter entering the game. Ultimately, the last part of this comment belies the absurdity of holding up one-dimensional fastball hitters as the epitome of pinch hitting. If any batter off the bench were talented enough to hit a big league breaking ball, who would choose Marcus Thames over him? Furthermore, if Edgar Renteria is on deck with two outs, who would send up a Thames to hack away at the first pitch he sees, rather than employing the best option to try to work a walk and give the superior hitter an opportunity?

In reality, the definition of the ideal pinch hitter as an aggressive, dead red hacker is an inversion of causes. Due to their limited ability, aggressive mistake-hitters are often relegated to pinch hitting duties, where they sometimes experience modest success. To say that their limited style is therefore more desirable than the ability to wait for a pitch to hit or draw a walk strikes me as an exercise in placating the sensitive egos of the Thames, Monroes and Dobbs‘ of the world, rather than a legitimate search for baseball truth.

Dear Bruce Bochy and Charlie Manuel,

We each have the distinct honor of playing a significant role in one of the most astonishing anatomical feats known to man. Somehow, through miracles of windups, scap loading, arm speed, and raw torque, Cole Hamels and Tim Lincecum are able to pitch baseballs with extraordinary skill. Both the Phillies and the Giants need their young aces a great deal. In the Phillies’ case, Hamels is the only pitcher in which the team can have consistent confidence. In the Giants’ case, well, Lincecum is the only player that matters. That is why, despite the fact that we are non-sentient ligaments in the pitching elbows of these two star pitchers, we have taken it upon ourselves to question the wisdom of your decisions.

You see, we are not just any elbow ligaments. We’re the critical ligaments in each player’s pitching elbow (for Hamels, the left, for Lincecum, the right) that create the torque and affords them such remarkable arm speed: the ulnar collateral ligament. Sure, you may have heard of us. But you usually only hear our names invoked when a pitcher has torn us. (More commonly, we are not even referred by name but by our initials: UCL. We hate that abbreviation. We think it is ugly.) The result of such a tear, unfortunately, requires the eponymous surgery first received by Tommy John in 1974. Though great gains have been made since Dr. Frank Jobe first pioneered the process of replacing ligaments like us that have torn (or snapped) with ones from the non-pitching elbow or knee, it is still an all too common occurrence, especially among younger players. Research has shown that excessive pitch counts, especially ones above 100 for a single start, can have tremendous impact on a pitcher’s health.

For the twofold reasons that, a) we don’t want to tear or snap, and b) as baseball fans we do not want to see these young pitchers get injured, we have to ask that you be very careful with us.

Allow us to use two in-game situations to demonstrate. Mr. Bochy, on April 24th against the Padres, you had Lincecum in the game. He had cruised through six innings, allowing no runs and just three hits while striking out nine batters. Needless to say, though, all those strikeouts had taken a toll on Lincecum’s arm, of which one of us is a central part. Through those six innings, he had pitched a total of 109 pitches. This excess by itself would not have been a big deal. We are reasonable; we understand pitchers need to finish innings. But then you ran Lincecum out to the mound in the 7th. After an 8 pitch walk to Kahlil Greene, Lincecum was up to 117 pitches. And yet, no hook. In fact, Lincecum was left in for two more batters, finally leaving after surrendering a single to Tony Clark. In 6.3 innings, Lincecum finished with a total of 122 pitches. Let me tell you, as ligaments with inside information, this was not pleasant.

Mr. Manuel (I hope someday you’ll let us call you Cholly, like hard-workin’ ligament-guys), we are equally concerned with your decisions. Just the day before Mr. Bochy made his error with Lincecum, you made a similar mistake with Hamels in a game versus the Brewers. Your star on the mound had pitched well through seven innings, allowing three runs (all in the first inning), striking out 11 and walking just two. He reportedly asked to stay in the game for the eighth inning to face the thunderous heart of the Milwaukee order: Braun, Fielder, Hart. You, being a player-friendly manager, understood and probably even admired Hamels’ determination. But you must not let Cole sway you, for he knows not how he hurts us. He had already pitched 110 pitches through those seven innings. Nevertheless, clinging to a narrow 4-3 lead, you stuck with your ace for the 8th. In the next 11 pitches, Hamels not only lost the lead (after two hard hit drives to right center, one by Braun good for a double and the next by Fielder an oh-brother shot to the bleachers), but he also put unnecessary strain on the same elbow that cost him a month at the end of last season due to injury. As a part of that elbow, we can safely say that we are trying our best not to snap. We just need a little help.

So that’s why we’re asking you, as ligaments first and as fans second, to go easy on the young arms. Because while it is true that there are some pitchers out there with rubber arms who always seem to defy the medical odds, there is no way to know if Lincecum or Hamels is one of those pitchers without first crossing the point of no return. And sirs, there is no one who is less eager to find out than us.

Signed,
Ulnar Collateral Ligament of Cole Hamels
Ulnar Collateral Ligament of Tim Lincecum

Dear Cecil Cooper,

You have a difficult job. You stepped in as the interim manager of the struggling Astros in the middle of last season. Though it was hardly your fault, the team finished with its first losing season in almost a decade. The Astros offense was buoyed by a strong season from Carlos Lee, a solid–if down–year from Lance Berkman, and the emergence of rookie Swiss Army Knife Hunter Pence. With Ed Wade’s addition of Miguel Tejada, the Astros have both solidified a solid offensive core and announced their intentions to try to win now in a weak NL Central.

No, sir, your problem does not lie in any bat. The problem is the run prevention, not the run scoring. In the rotation, behind Roy Oswalt, your team has more retreads than the shoulder of Interstate 10. And, like it or not, they aren’t going to be getting bailed out by the defense. In fact, your infield defense is one of the most sieve-like in all of baseball. The mere replacement of Adam Everett with Tejada makes an enormous impact on your team’s ability to turn batted balls into outs. And while Kaz Matsui is probably a defensive improvement over the Craig Biggio/Chris Burke timeshare at second, he’ll have to cover for some of Berkman’s mistakes at first as well. Many have talked about moving Tejada to third in attempt to keep his bat worthwhile as his defense declines, but the position is taken by Ty Wigginton. What’s a manager to do?

Well, Mr. Cooper, I sympathize with your position. And not only that, I’ve got an idea that I think might help you. It’s going to sound crazy, but I assure it’s not any crazier than trying to win now with this team. And, let’s be honest, if that’s the mandate from Mr. Wade, you’re going to need at least some crazy ideas.

So here goes: move Tejada to third, Wigginton to second and Matsui to short.

The word from spring training is that Tejada looks more and more like a liability at short every day. Sure it was in 2004 that Matsui last played shortstop, but he held his own, adding +6 runs above average (according to Baseball Prospectus’s RAA stat) to the Mets defense that year. Even with the time it would take to readjust, I think that’s a big improvement over Tejada. Moving Wigginton to second may seem dicier, but consider this. As a third baseman over the last two years, he has been worth 8 runs below average in 114 games. In the 82 games he played at second base with the then-Devil Rays over the same period, he rated a total of 4 runs below average. If nothing else, Wigginton is no worse at second than he is at third, and considering second is the harder of the two positions, it seems wise to move him across the infield. And while other defensive metrics show a slightly different picture (David Pinto’s PMR rates him below average at both positions, but worse at second, whereas UZR rates him as near-average at second but awful at third), any losses would likely be made up by playing Tejada at third, where he could be an above-average defender.

Tejada, of course, may be the sticking point. He has been a shortstop his entire career, and he will be reluctant to give that up. But perhaps there is hope: his childhood idol growing up in the Dominican Republic was another great shortstop who moved to the hot corner as his glove declined: Cal Ripken, Jr. Tejada’s last three years at shortstop: +2, -5, -15 RAA. Tejada simply is no longer the flashy fielder he was when he was an Athletic.

Mr. Cooper, you may balk at switching the position of three different players during spring training. But with all the question marks filling out your rotation, if you want any chance to win this season you need to have the best defensive alignment possible on the field at all times. Your outfield defense is something to be proud of, but they can’t knock down ground balls up the middle.

Defensively,
Tommy

I must admit that I was expecting a pitchers’ duel for last night’s Game 1, but it was not to be. The Red Sox bats were crackin’, and the Rockies seemed to show some rust from their much vaunted 8-day layoff. Jeff Francis struggled to establish his fastball, missing away for most of the outing, and then over-compensating by pitching to the inner half of the plate (notably on the 2-run double by Varitek). His curveball started out up in the zone, but settled into a solid offering after the first inning. Overall, he didn’t actually look as bad as his line would suggest. The Red Sox hitters did an excellent job of punishing his mistakes, driving the ball to all fields and beating the Rockies defense with a number of nearly fielded hits up the middle.

As with any situational challenge, an extended layoff is likely to affect players in different ways. In analysis, we have a tendency to boil game conditions down to trends that either confirm or deny a statistically significant effect on a player’s performance. While I am quick to defend analysis from its ignorant detractors, I am willing to acknowledge the haziness of any attempt to quantify an effect like an extended break between games. In retrospect, it is easy to say the team was hurt by its vacation week, but the overall effect is more complicated than that. Maybe we should say that Troy Tulowitzki (2/3, 2 doubles) benefited from the rest, while Brad Hawpe (0/4, 4 K) suffered. Maybe Ryan Speier felt a bit rusty (no outs, 3 BB with the bases loaded), while LaTroy Hawkins couldn’t care less (1 IP, 2 K, 0 baserunners). Ultimately, some guys adjusted, and others failed to do so. That’s how you win or lose ballgames.

Regardless of the back story, Game 1 has set the stage for Clint Hurdle’s pitching strategy here on out. He now knows what not to expect from Franklin Morales in a bullpen role. He also knows that Speier will not be able to scare the team into submission by impersonating top draft bust Daniel Bard. On the bright side, he got his better relievers into a game situation, and they responded well. Hawkins looked particularly strong to me, although he was facing the worst hitters on the team in Crisp and Hinske. Herges and Affeldt both looked sharp, with the former facing the heart of the Red Sox order (albeit in a low leverage situation). Tonight’s Game 2 will depend on Baldy’s ability to rely on his stuff, while avoiding the walk yips that have plagued his teammates so far. He certainly has the stuff to do it if he’s on.

The Red Sox put together quite the comeback in the ALCS, capping it all off with a drubbing of Cleveland at home last night. Commentators have inevitably turned to some of the turning points for the Red Sox, both in the series and in last night’s game. Many have pointed to Kenny Lofton getting tagged out at second with no outs in the top of the seventh. There’s a tendency to cherry pick these sorts of moments.

Had the Indians pulled off a comeback last night and put the Red Sox to bed, I think we would all have looked at the incredible at-bat Ryan Garko had off Daisuke Matsuzaka in the fourth inning, which drove in Travis Hafner (improbably in scoring position after breaking an 0-16 skid in the ALCS) with two outs.

Matsuzaka started Garko off with two good pitches: a slider for a called strike and a fastball fouled off, both high and away. In an 0-2 hole, Garko battled off two pitches in the strike zone (a shuuto and a curveball, both low and and away), then fouled off a 95 MPH fastball at the letters. Staying alive, Garko took a slow slider off the outside of the plate for ball one. On the seventh pitch of the at-bat, Garko fouled off yet another pitch, this one a cutter low and outside. He took one more 96 MPH fastball off the plate for a ball before ripping a hanging slider in the wheelhouse deep into centerfield, bouncing off the wall and making it a two run ball game.

Garko’s at bat not only drew the Indians’ first blood, it tired out Matsuzaka (who, if you believe FOX announcers, is more fragile than a Faberge egg) and showed excellent discipline batting in an 0-2 count. It makes one wonder what the Indians would do with Garko if they go ahead with their plan to use Victor Martinez at first more often, simultaneously giving more at-bats to the underrated (and overqualified) Kelly Shoppach. Not that this is a pressing concern, the Indians lost, and Cleveland is making its case to unseat Philadelphia as the City of Losers. Eric Wedge and Mark Shapiro have dozens of holes of golf before they have to start worrying about position battles.

Tonight’s game will be a battle of tired pitching staffs pushing to get a patch on their hats and an opportunity for much more. I realize I have given much attention to the Indians’ relief corps, but I have failed to draw the picture for the Red Sox. Here are some observations.

Yesterday, the Red Sox brass announced that Josh Beckett, winner and conqueror of Game 5, would be available to take his scheduled side session in-game, in the form of 25 pitches out of the bullpen. While this is a great news story, I think it is unlikely to have an impact on the game. Francona’s previous follies notwithsanding, I expect Beckett only to make an appearance if the game should go to extra innings, or if Matsuzaka throws a Disaster Start (more runs than IP). If Daisuke can notch 4 effective innings, I think Francona brings in Wakefield for a turn through the order (2 or 3 innings), and then Timlin and Okajima, who have both been flawless this ALCS, try to bridge to Papelbon. Lester is coming off a strong 3 innings showing in Game 4, so he will serve as long man if Wakefield is wild or ineffective. One of the biggest concerns for a Red Sox fan is that Francona will pull an Eric Wedge and neglect to notice that his lights out middle innings guy, Manny Delcarmen, has gone the way of Rafael Perez over the past few games. This kind of short term memory loss can kill a team in a postseason series, as the manager sees the kid’s 2.05 season ERA instead of the six baserunners he’s allowed in his last 1 2/3 IP.

We shall see, we shall see.

Here are a few observations from the game that guaranteed the post-season some Game 7 drama:

Told ya so: Rafael Perez is cooked for the season. Tonight Wedge succumbed to habit and called upon him in a 5-1 game, and he responded by allowing multiple runs in 1/3 of an inning for the third straight appearance. Apparently the skipper considered this to be a high leverage situation, as he would have otherwise gone to long reliever Tom Mastny, who had been warming in the first inning. I agree with Wedge’s tactics here; he recognized that the outcome of the game depended on keeping the Red Sox within firing range, even if it meant using a high leverage arm in the third inning. The unfavorable outcome resulted from an error in execution: Wedge failed to identify the man for the job, instead going on habit and marching Raffy Perez to his doom. A more creative solution, such as Tom Mastny, would have showed a sensitivity to context that is essential in a manager. Instead, Perez left with the score 10-1, well out of reach of even the Indians’ potent offense.

More on the bullpen: The consolation prize for Cleveland tonight was excellent relief pitching from rookie and nominal mop-up man Aaron Laffey. The 22 year-old kid shot 4 2/3 innings of scoreless, one-hit ball against a talented, albeit relaxed, Red Sox offense. This showing allowed the Tribe’s overburdened studs (Rafael Betancourt says hi and thx) to get an extra day of rest before the all-hands-on-deck call on Sunday. Unfortunately, Laffey pitched so well in the blowout that Eric Wedge couldn’t find a spot to dust off Aaron Fultz and see what he has left to offer. After Borowskis showing, Wedge’s game plan Sunday night should be to ride Westbrook through six solid, bring in Jensen Lewis as a setup man in the seventh, and ride Betancourt to a two inning save. I doubt he’ll do it this way, but I think it’s his best bet.

Also from the “Told ya so” file: Boston’s offense put on a clinic, in large part due to the ability to get on base throughout the lineup. When every starting hitter reaches base safely, it certainly helps score some runs. True, the team was helped by a large number of infield hits and a couple strange errors, but it also benefitted from extra base hits from Lugo and Drew, walks from Varitek, and solid contact by Jacoby Ellsbury. It will be interesting to see if the adjustments made in Game 6 can be duplicated against Jake Westbrook on Sunday night.

So the Red Sox bats finally came back to life in Game 5, supporting Josh Beckett to stave off elimination and force a game six tonight (at 8). I’ve heard many people talk as if the Red Sox have gotten over all their shortcomings and are ready to play their way into the World Series. A little taste of success can make people forget how bad things were just two days ago.

The reality is that not all that much has changed since before Beckett’s Game 5 gem. A few things are suddenly looking up for the Red Sox, such as home field advantage and wear and tear on Cleveland’s staff, but there are flaws that they must still address if they are to foil the Indians’ ambitions. Yes, the Boston offense produced well on Thursday, but once again the bottom of the lineup remained dormant. I identified the inability of the 6-9 hitters to draw walks in the postseason, and only J.D. Drew managed to reverse that trend. Varitek and Lugo continued their poor hitting, and Crisp extended his streak to 12 consecutive at bats without reaching base safely. It is hard to win a ballgame with a block of automatic outs at the bottom of the order. To address this, Terry Francona proved that he is not deaf, blind and lacking in sense of smell by announcing today that Jacoby Ellsbury will start in place of the struggling breakfast cereal in center field. This is a necessary move, and it comes far later than it should have. Time will tell the dividends.

The other wrinkle that favors the Red Sox is the increasing wear and tear on the Cleveland bullpen. Eric Wedge came into the playoffs with four power bullpen arms in lefties Rafael Perez and Aaron Fultz, along with righties Rafael Betancourt and Jensen Lewis. This seems like a luxury from the most pleasant dreams of most managers. Instead of taking full advantage of this strength, however, Wedge burdened one of his most reliable rookies early in the postseason, sapping his effectiveness and leaving the rest of his bullpen a bit more exposed. Wedge used Rafael Perez to devastating effect in the first two games of the ALDS against the Yankees. He struck out 5 in 4 perfect innings over 2 consecutive nights, one of which was a blowout win. Since then the rookie has allowed 6 runs and 7 base runners over 2 2/3 IP. Stick a fork in him, Eric.

Meanwhile, Wedge has decided to lean on the other rookie, Jensen Lewis, thus far in the ALCS, where he has been inconsistent while allowing 3 runs over 5 1/3 IP in 4 games. As Lewis gets his work in Aaron Fultz has ridden the bench since game one, when he walked both batters he faced before being pulled. It will be difficult for Wedge to put a game on the shoulders of a reliever, however effective he usually is, who hasn’t gotten an out since October 7 and has pitched a mere one inning since September.

Rafael Betancourt has been the brightest star for the Indians, allowing two baserunners and no runs over 8 1/3 IP in the postseason to date. He will be asked to hold onto a lead in the game tonight. Even if he should do so successfully, Indians fans have to be worried about the prospects for the World Series after Wedge’s gulag of postseason bullpen management.

I’m sorry for the hiatus from writing….I have been too busy watching FOX on mute and figuring out new creative ways to spend less than $20 in 3.5 hours at a sports bar. From a fiscal perspective, maybe I should reverse course and root for the Sox to go down tonight so my wallet can catch a break before the World Series.

My personal preferences notwithstanding, the Red Sox are threatening to act in my economic interest of their own accord with their lackluster play and poor starting pitching. Despite 96 regular season wins to the contrary, they are playing like a poorly constructed team, with a bottom of the order that pumps the ball into opposing fielders’ mitts, leaving the boppers on base at every opportunity. Here are the postseason stats for the Red Sox 6-9 hitters:

It’s kind of gross that Varitek’s .385 slugging percentage looks strong in comparison to his colleagues. Mind you, all five of these guys had fairly pedestrian seasons. Not one of them cracked an .800 OPS, but the team still ranked in the top 5 in the American league in every offensive category, including third in runs scored. How did they do it?

During the season, the Red Sox maintained a very respectable offensive pace on the weight of their OBP in the 1-8 spots of the order (assuming outmachine Lugo bats 9th). Seven of their nine starters had OBP above .365 (league average was .338), and they weighed in at .362 as a team. Even Coco Crisp bounced back from his weak plate discipline last year to boost his walk total to a career-best 49 unintentionals. Drew and Varitek were the real achievers here, as they suffered through dry spells for much of the year, but still managed OBPs of .373 and .367, respectively.

Then they met the Indians, who beat them soundly with two mediocre starters in a row. Jake Westbrook and Paul Byrd: what they have in common is a reliable ability to throw strikes. This eliminated the Red Sox’s most consistent offensive weapon, the base on balls. By pounding first strikes into the zone, these two pitchers dominated the bottom half of the Red Sox order. If C.C. Sabathia takes a pointer from these two soft tossers’ successes, the Red Sox of 2007 will become history tonight.

To prevent this anticlimactic end to the series, Francona has to step up and make something happen. His lineup of veterans has been painfully static next to the dynamism of the young Cleveland team. Even though he has been unwilling to shake things up in the past, now is the time to infuse the team with some energy. He’s starting Bobby Kielty today against the lefty, which worked out in Game 1. What I want to see, and what we should have seen all along, is a more flexible employment of Jacoby Ellsbury in center and right field. Particularly against the second tier starters that demolished the Red Sox in Games 2 and 3, Ellsbury could have been a real contributor. The exciting youngster hit .361/.390/.536 and went 8 for 8 on the bases in 105 PA down the stretch. In all fairness, Drew was absolutely on fire down the stretch as well, with a .342/.454/.618 line in 97 PA in September. Coco Crisp deserves to be the odd man out, playing just below his already mediocre season totals through September (.269/.311/.388 in 77 PA) and losing playing time to Ellsbury due to nagging injuries.

All speculation moving forward points to Ellsbury as the long term solution in center field, leading to a trade of Coco Crisp or his imminent conversion to fourth outfielder. It has become clear that the kid is ready now, and better than Crisp. If the shift will happen next year anyways, why wait to put your best team on the field? Francona has developed a bit of the dreaded veteran loyalty that can cripple a team in a high pressure series like the ALCS. His obstinacy is forcing the Red Sox most dynamic young position prospect to watch from the dugout as Indians 21 year-old second baseman Asdrubal Cabrera adjusts to the game’s biggest stage and puts on a bit of a show.

Cole Hamels says he won’t pitch game 4 on three days of rest. That is quite prudent, coming off a sore elbow just a couple weeks ago. Charlie Manuel is seriously placing his team’s future in jeopardy riding his young guns as he has. On Tuesday he kept Hamels in for 115 pitches, sending him back out for the 7th inning with 108 pitches already thrown. In his previous start, Manuel kept him in for 116 pitches in a must-win game where he was pitching like an ace. The Phillies won by 6 runs. The elbow problems are a concern, and they are not likely to go away with this usage pattern. Optimists will look at his reasonable total of 190 IP to date, but a deeper look shows that Hamels has gone over 110 pitches a whopping 12 times this season, and 10 of those games the Phillies won by 3 or more runs. I know their bullpen is bad, but there has to be someone you can trust with a reasonable sized lead in the mid-late innings. Next year’s playoff contention depends on it.