We all have bad days. It’s just that, when you’re the best pitcher in baseball, nobody expects a bad season from you. In fact, nobody even expects a bad day from you. Which is why Johan Santana can have a season like his 2007 (where he pitched 219 innings of 3.33 ERA ball, struck out 235 batters, walked just 52 batters, and made 33 starts for the fourth year running) and have people label it a down year. The Johaters point to his 33 HR allowed (which led the AL and was third in the majors) and, well, I think that’s it. They just point to the home runs.

But in truth, Santana does have bad days. He is human. So what I have done is put on my spats and ventured into the brave world of PITCHf/x. I took Santana’s best and worst starts from 2007 (by Game Score) and let the tea leaves fall where they may.

The Good
Santana’s best start came on August 19, and boy was it a good one.

Santana had his best stuff that day, and it was good for a Game Score of 95. First, here is a graph of the pitch velocity vs. the amount of break:

The two large clusters represent his fastball and his notorious change up. To more clearly identify the pitches (and with the help of the ever-informative Hardball Times), I made a chart that plots horizontal vs. vertical movement of the pitch, and is color-coded by pitch speed:

More graphs after the jump. (more…)

Perhaps to temper Caleb’s gushing, or perhaps to encourage it, I’d like to draw your attention to a piece by Bill James over at Slate.com in praise of Craig Biggio.

An excerpt:

I’ll still say today, if there was a draft and you could look ahead and say, “OK, that guy’s going to be Ken Griffey, that guy’s going to be Frank Thomas, that guy’s going to be Juan Gonzalez, that guy’s going to be Tom Glavine, that guy’s going to be Craig Biggio,” just give me Biggio and I’ll take my chances. Maybe that’s not what the numbers say is the right answer, but Biggio was the guy who would do whatever needed to be done. Makes it a lot easier to build a team.

And then the story went on a little too long. You ever go to a movie, it’ s pretty good for about an hour and a half but then the story is over but it’s like the director can’t find the ending so it goes on for another half-hour looking for some way to tie things together? That’s kind of Biggio’s career; it was over, and then it went on for quite awhile.

Oh, my god! Craig Biggio’s career is like AI! Just kidding, not even Neifi Perez sinks to that level.

I also go through phases with players, like James is describing. Before his 2005 pitcher-devastation tour, I was a fervent (and perhaps irascible) Derrek Lee supporter. Now that he’s sinking in the batting order and in the hearts of fans, maybe it’s safe again to laud his unique combination of power, speed and defense at first base.

Another player I always had an inexplicable (or at least non-team-based) affinity for was Dave Henderson, whom I believe remains to this day the oldest player ever to hit for the cycle.

Go on and share your non-favorite-team favorite players in the comments. Any Bucky Backers in the house?

Curtis Granderson is such a useful player. Last year he was a little prepackaged ball of productivity, with all the accouterments to appeal to traditionalists and statisticians alike.

You dig defense? Curtis takes excellent routes in center field, exploiting his athleticism without relying on lightning speed. Like bat speed? He knocks line drives at a healthy (and sustainable) rate of 21.8% of balls in play, which should temper the sobering threat of dramatic regression to the mean by continuing to generate a high batting average on balls in play in 2008. Considering that his swing created 84(!) extra base hits in 2007, I would say that he does not lack pop. Worried about plate discipline? His high strikeout rate will always be a concern, but a closer look at his 2007 splits shows that he shaved off a few percentage points in the second half last year. While we can’t expect the 27 year-old to go all Jose Reyes and completely change his approach, we can hope that he manages to play toward his patient streak (4+ career pitches seen per PA) and avoid flailing too much.

Believe it’s the ever-intangible work ethic (”make-up”) that makes or breaks a budding star? After spending his off-season engaged in outreach and goodwill appearances, Granderson reported early to spring training to get back in the groove and aim for a more consistent season in 2008. He idolizes fellow rising star Grady Sizemore.

Maybe you dream of speed on the basepaths. Granderson doesn’t light the world on fire in the 40-yard dash, but he has explosive acceleration and excellent instincts. He dominated the basepaths, going 26 for 27 in stolen base attempts (yes, that’s a 96% success rate). Out of the box, only 4 other players were less likely than Granderson to ground into a double play in a given plate appearance. Want smarts in addition to savvy? Curtis holds two business degrees and blogs regularly and eloquently for ESPN.

Ultimately, Curtis Granderson’s future as a star or a mere regular lies in his ability to hit against lefties. Last year, while he personified Hank Greenberg in 543 plate appearances against the more common breed of pitchers (AVG/OBP/SLG: .337/.393/.621), he “hit” his lefty brethren to a beyond-anemic tune of .160/.225/.269, while striking out in 30% of his 133 plate appearances. Honestly, the fact that Curtis only reached base 27 more times than I would against southpaws is a sign that there is still room for improvement in his already dynamic game. I say, let’s see it happen, and you can leave your mark in more than the obscure statistic area of baseball’s collective memory.

A year and a day ago wasn’t only the day our sister site was born. It was also a sunny day in Clearwater, Florida. Jimmy Rollins wasn’t yet the MVP, the Phillies were not yet the NL East champions and Tommy G. had not yet imploded. They were exciting times, sure, but by and large the rivalry between the Phillies and the Mets was limited to drunken men yelling on Broad Street and in Flushing, Queens.

Jimmy Rollins decided to do what all athletes, from Plaxico Burress to Rasheed Wallace, love to do: predict their own success even in the face of staggering unlikelihood. On February 20, 2007, Rollins proclaimed:

Bottom line, we’re the team to beat, I can’t put it any other way.

Of course, you all know the rest of the story. Rollins’ first MVP and the Phillies first division title in 14 years later, it was the ultimate told-you-so.

We all know what the best response to told-you-so is, and that’s “I know you are but what am I.” Except, this year, Carlos Beltran turned it around and made it kind of a “I know we are but what are you?” On Saturday, Beltran said:

I think without [Santana] last year, we did good until the end of the season. So this year, to Jimmy Rollins, we are the team to beat.

Clearly, the importance of the acquisition of Johan Santana is not lost on the team. They are excited for the season, which is great. But Beltran is the equivalent of the kid in school who gets teased, only to think of a comeback on the bus home hours later. Or like this classic episode of Seinfeld. And of course, just like with George, as soon as he had uttered his belatedly-conceived retort, his adversary was ready with yet one more reply. Yesterday, Rollins responded.

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Via Above the Law comes the possibility that the recently agreed-upon deal between Miami-Dade county and the Florida Marlins to build a $515 million stadium may run afoul of the Florida State Constitution. From the ATL article:

The Florida Constitution, meanwhile, includes its own language that may prevent Florida’s municipalities from subsidizing stadiums. Article VII, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution states that “[n]either the state nor any county … shall become a joint owner with, or stockholder of, or give, lend or use its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person.” In addition, Article VII, Section 9 prevents Florida’s counties from levying taxes for anything other than “municipal purposes.” The Supreme Court of Florida, in Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach (1966), held that building a professional baseball stadium is not a municipal purpose.

Nevertheless, Florida’s municipalities continue to regularly subsidize sports facilities without much of a legal challenge. Perhaps because enforcing Brandes’s narrow interpretation of “municipal purposes” would lead to Florida losing most, if not all, of its professional sports teams, no current court would likely adopt this interpretation.

The stadium deal (which will be voted upon by the county commissioners on Thursday) would have Miami-Dade taxpayers footing $347 million of the bill (~67% of the sticker price). The city of Miami would contribute $13 million to the stadium, and another $10 million to demolish the Orange Bowl. The Marlins and Loria would kick in just $155 million, which they could likely recoup by selling the naming rights to the stadium.

It seems extremely unlikely to me that any constitutional challenges would be raised, even if the deal is approved. However, it seems as though there is a serious breach. The only way a baseball stadium might even remotely resemble a “municipal stadium” is if the team is competitive and operates with the goal of winning. Nobody is arguing Jeffrey Loria’s goal is to win.

This editorial in Miami Today offers perhaps the most biting critique of the deal:

The only real payback the ballpark contract gives the public is two free private suites and 22 box seats at each Marlins game — a seat for each commissioner, mayor and manager, plus private suites for their handlers and financial supporters.
On the other hand, maybe that’s the reason to sign. It’s rotten policy at far too high a cost with no ceiling in sight, but at least our public officials would be amply cared for.
If the stadium belongs to the public, officials wouldn’t even have to list their free seats as gifts. Going to games would just become part of the job. And the public would pay for that, too.

Did I mention the $60 million the City of Miami will also kick in for a 6,000 car parking garage? After it’s built, the team will buy the parking spaces and resell them.

As former Miami Herald columnist Dave Barry was fond of saying, I am not making this up.

In my post yesterday, I argued that GMs like to give long-term contract extensions to two types of young players: high-strikeout pitchers and toolsy, defensive-minded players. Because I live a solipsistic existence and believe that others exist to confirm my beliefs about the world, I’m going to believe that Rangers GM Jon Daniels just wanted me to look good.

Yesterday, the Worldwide Leader’s Jerry Crasnick reported that the Rangers and 2B Ian Kinsler had worked out a five-year extension. The deal guarantees Kinsler, who has two years of service time under his belt, $22 million over the five years. It also includes a team option for a sixth year at $10 million. Kinsler was set to become a free agent before the 2012 season, so the deal buys out all of his arbitration years and either one or two of his free agency years (depending on whether the option is picked up). This contract has all the same features as the ones I discussed yesterday. The best comparison is probably to Brandon Phillips, who has an extra year’s worth of service time on Kinsler, and who signed a deal that was a year shorter and $5 million richer.

Kinsler had a strange season last year. After setting the world on fire in April (.298/.375/.667 with 9 HR), he slumped hard in May (.174/.267/.228 with just 1 HR). He was a solid and consistent performer the rest of the way, save for July when he was sidelined by injury. In 906 career ABs, Kinsler is a .274/.351/.447, which is quite good for the keystone. The recently released PECOTA weighted means spreadsheet projects a .267/.341/.441 line with 19 HR and slightly above average defense for Kinsler in 2008. If he can continue to contribute at that level, Mr. Daniels will be quite pleased with his decision.

This winter, there have been two big trends in the hot stove: trading big-name pitchers for packages of prospects (Danny Haren, Johan Santana, Erik Bedard, and now possibly Joe Blanton) and locking up young players to long-term deals. Today, I’ll look at the various examples of the latter contract and see what I can see.

The logic for the pitcher-for-prospects swap is relatively obvious: if a player is allowed to hit free agency, he reaps almost his entire marginal revenue product. To the degree that teams can reach an arrangement that allows them to divide some of this economic profit between themselves, it benefits both of them to do so. For example, we would expect that the Diamondbacks would be willing to pay an amount up to the difference between what they expect Haren will be worth to them over the next two years minus his salaries for the two years. Since the Diamondbacks paid in prospects, similar calculations must be done for each prospect (with the answers more likely to vary, based on the less precise nature of minor league projections). As long as the valuations are not inaccurate, this type of trade can very likely benefit both teams.

The other type of deal we have seen a lot of this winter is the long-term deal reached with arbitration-eligible (or even pre-arbitration-eligible) players. In this type of deal, teams offer a young player a long term deal (typically four years or longer) with escalating salaries per year. These deals also frequently include club options for one, two or even three years beyond the length of the contract. The idea is to buy the player’s rights for seasons in which they would be eligible for salary arbitration (where their salary is not guaranteed). Recently, this type of deal is most often given to young, defensive minded position players or young, high-strikeout pitchers. To understand why, we need a little background.

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From Alan Schwarz’ excellent piece in Sunday’s Week in Review section of the New York Times, comes one of my favorite characterizations of statistics. Too bad it had to be about steroids.

Baseball statistics form one of the world’s great romance languages. In ways that mere words never could, numbers come to connote the traits of the men who attained them, from virtuosity (.406, Ted Williams’s 1941 batting average) to consistency (56, Joe DiMaggio’s hitting streak) to suffocating dominance (1.12, Bob Gibson’s 1968 earned run average). They tell stories.

I also like the line comparing statistics to bikinis. If you haven’t read his book, I highly recommend it.

Just wanted to throw some observations out there, even if they are all about NYC and Boston. Some bullet points:

After compiling the prospect ranking data into a big list and mushing it into various shapes, I would like to present some observations. First off, whom should we trust? While the rankings are fairly comparable at the top, each writer has a few soft spots and blind spots that we are happy to identify and gripe about. Of the four lists presented, I find the most frustrating to be that of MiLB.com. The list seems to be unwilling to recognize new top talent and less likely to punish formerly high-ranked players for disappointing performance. It is typical of this list, for example, that toolsy outfielder Andrew McCutchen rose from 15th last year to 8th overall in ‘08 despite his underwhelming statistical performance at AA. Does MiLB.com see his prospect status increase as he gets ostensibly closer to the bigs, even if there is no evidence that his talent is crystallizing? Or are we led to believe that the quality of this year’s prospect crop has declined to the point where a guy who is this far away from realizing his talent is in the top 10? For reference, the other lists have him 12th, 24th and 38th. Perhaps more disconcerting is MiLB.com’s complete omission of otherwise consensus Top 50 prospects like Jordan Schafer, Daric Barton, Matt LaPorta, Chin-Lung Hu, Geovany Soto, Manny Parra, and Jose Tabata in favor of guys like Tyler Colvin (#44), Alcides Escobar (#42), Radhames Liz (#45), Chris Volstad (#39) and Luke Hochevar (#40), who barely and rarely appear in any of the other experts’ top 100, let alone among the top 50.

My nitpicking, however, does not stop at MiLB.com. (more…)